Schering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission: Eleventh Circuit Rejects the FTC’s Position on “Reverse Payments” in Patent Suit Settlements by Quack, Ulrich et al.
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Antitrust Series
Year  Paper 
Schering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade
Commission: Eleventh Circuit Rejects the
FTC’s Position on “Reverse Payments” in
Patent Suit Settlements
Ulrich Quack∗ James Burling† Claus-Dieter Ehlermann‡
John Ratliff∗∗ Suyong Kim††
Douglas Melamed‡‡ William Kolasky§
∗WilmerHale
†
‡
∗∗
††
‡‡
§
This working paper is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be commer-
cially reproduced without the permission of the copyright holder.
http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art55
Copyright c©2005 by the authors.
Schering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade
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Patent Suit Settlements
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Kim, Douglas Melamed, and William Kolasky
Abstract
In recent years, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or the “Commission”)
has investigated several settlement agreements between pioneer and generic drug
manufacturers involving “reverse payments.” In the view of the FTC, reverse pay-
ments are cash that a pioneer drug manufacturer pays to a generic manufacturer
who has challenged the patent(s) protecting the pioneer drug, in exchange for the
generic manufacturer’s agreement to delay market entry. Such payments some-
times occur in the settlement of patent infringement actions. The Commission
has been extremely skeptical of reverse payments, viewing them as objective in-
dicia of intent to illegally share monopoly profits that the delayed generic entry
perpetuates. It has successfully challenged settlement agreements that included
reverse payments involving the market entry of generic Cardizem (hypertension
treatment) and generic Hytrin (hypertension and angina treatment).
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Introduction
In recent years, the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC” or the “Commission”) 
has investigated several settlement 
agreements between pioneer and generic 
drug manufacturers involving “reverse 
payments.” In the view of the FTC, 
reverse payments are cash that a pioneer 
drug manufacturer pays to a generic 
manufacturer who has challenged the 
patent(s) protecting the pioneer drug, in 
exchange for the generic manufacturer’s 
agreement to delay market entry. Such 
payments sometimes occur in the 
settlement of patent infringement actions. 
The Commission has been extremely 
skeptical of reverse payments, viewing 
them as objective indicia of intent to 
illegally share monopoly proﬁts that the 
delayed generic entry perpetuates.1 It 
has successfully challenged settlement 
agreements that included reverse 
payments involving the market entry 
of generic Cardizem (hypertension 
treatment) and generic Hytrin 
(hypertension and angina treatment).
Most recently, the Commission ruled 
that two settlement agreements 
involving the market entry of generic 
K-Dur 20 (hypertension and congestive 
heart failure treatment) ran afoul of the 
antitrust laws because they incorporated 
reverse payments to the generic drug 
manufacturer. On March 8, 2005, in 
Schering-Plough v. Federal Trade Commission, 
the Eleventh Circuit overruled the 
FTC’s decision and held that the reverse 
payments, standing alone, were not 
evidence of anticompetitive behavior. 
The court observed that the settlement 
agreements at issue (which allowed early 
market entry for generic K-Dur 20) were 
less anticompetitive than enforcement 
of the patent for K-Dur 20, which is 
presumptively valid as a matter of law. 
Although courts typically give some 
deference to the Commission’s informed 
judgment that a particular commercial 
practice violates the FTC Act, the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Schering-
Plough was decidedly non-deferential 
to the Commission’s judgment that 
reverse payments are presumptively 
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anticompetitive. The decision may signal 
that patent litigants in the pharmaceutical 
industry will now have more ﬂexibility to 
resolve their claims through negotiated 
settlement without prompting FTC 
inquiry. Parties and their counsel must 
still ensure, however, that reverse 
payments are in the context of bona ﬁde 
settlements and do not represent de 
facto agreements between pioneer drug 
manufacturers and non-infringing generic 
suppliers to share monopoly rents. 
Schering-Plough’s Settlement 
Agreements with Upsher-
Smith and ESI Lederle  
Schering-Plough Corp. (Schering) owned 
a formulation patent on the extended-
release coating of K-Dur 20, which was due 
to expire on September 5, 2006. In 1995, 
Upsher-Smith Laboratories (Upsher) and 
ESI Lederle, Inc. (ESI)2 sought FDA approval 
to market their own generic versions of 
K-Dur 20. Schering separately sued Upsher 
and ESI for patent infringement. The parties 
eventually settled these suits in 1997. 
As part of the settlement with Upsher, 
the parties agreed that Upsher would not 
market its generic version of K-Dur 20 until 
at least September 1, 2001, ﬁve years ahead 
of the patent’s September 2006 expiration 
date. Schering also agreed to license 
certain Upsher products for $60 million 
in initial royalty fees and a later payment 
of $10 million in milestone royalties.
As part of the settlement with ESI, 
the parties agreed that ESI would not 
enter the market with a generic version 
of K-Dur 20 until at least January 1, 
2004–more than two years ahead of 
the patent’s expiration date. Schering 
agreed to pay ESI: $5 million for its legal 
fees, up to $10 million contingent upon 
FDA approval of ESI’s generic product, 
and $15 million for certain licenses.
The FTC Complaint
On March 30, 2001, the FTC ﬁled an 
administrative complaint against Schering, 
Upsher and ESI’s parent, American 
Home Products Corporation (AHP). 
The complaint alleged that Schering’s 
settlements with Upsher and ESI were 
illegal agreements in restraint of trade, in 
violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45, and Section 
1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1.3 
After a long trial, the FTC’s administrative 
law judge held that both agreements 
were lawful settlements of legitimate 
patent lawsuits and dismissed the 
complaint. He found speciﬁcally that 
FTC complaint counsel had failed to 
establish that Schering’s royalty payments 
to Upsher and ESI were not legitimate 
consideration for the respective, licensed 
products or that the additional settlement 
payment to EDI was solely for the 
purpose of delayed generic entry.
Further, the ALJ found that the 
anticompetitive affects of these settlement 
agreements had to be assessed in light 
of Schering’s presumptively valid patent 
for K-Dur 20, which remained in effect 
until September 2006. Thus, the ALJ 
reasoned, the settlement agreements were 
no more anticompetitive then Schering’s 
enforcement of its patents. There was, 
moreover, no basis in the record for 
concluding that (1) Schering’s patent was 
invalid; or (2) Upsher’s or ESI’s products 
did not actually infringe the patent.
The FTC’s complaint counsel appealed 
the ALJ’s decision to the full Commission. 
On December 8, 2003, the Commission 
reversed the ALJ, holding that Schering’s 
2
2.    ESI’s former parent company, American Home Products Corporation, now 
Wyeth, is a Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP client. 
3.    On October 12, 2001, the complaint against AHP was withdrawn to consider a proposed 
consent agreement, which the FTC approved on April 2, 2002. AHP was not a party to 
either the trial before the ALJ or the subsequent proceedings. The legality of Schering’s 
settlement with ESI/AHP, however, remained at issue with respect to Schering.
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settlements with Upsher and ESI had 
violated the FTC and Sherman Acts. In so 
ruling, the Commission rejected the ALJ’s 
factual ﬁnding that the “reverse payments” 
to Upsher and ESI were legitimate 
consideration; instead the Commission 
found they were a quid pro quo for delayed 
entry of generic versions of K-Dur 20. 
In addition, the Commission gave no 
weight to the ALJ’s reasoning that the 
anticompetitive effects of the settlement 
agreements had to be assessed in 
light of the exclusionary effects of 
Schering’s presumptively valid patents. 
Instead, the Commission assumed 
that the generic versions of K-Dur 20 
would have entered the market earlier 
absent the reverse payments and did 
not consider the merits of the patent 
litigation in which Schering asserted the 
generic versions violated its patents. 
Schering and Upsher timely petitioned 
the Eleventh Circuit for review 
of the Commission’s ruling.
The Eleventh Circuit’s 
Decision
The Eleventh Circuit set aside the FTC’s 
decision in a sharply worded, 43-page 
decision, handed down just over one 
month after oral argument. The court held 
that the Commission had inappropriately 
ignored the ALJ’s factual ﬁndings, such as 
the determination that the $60 million 
payment from Schering to Upsher was a 
bona ﬁde royalty payment for licenses that 
Schering obtained. The court criticized 
the Commission for relying on “somewhat 
forced evidence” in concluding that 
Schering’s royalty payments were part 
of a quid pro quo arrangement aimed at 
preserving Schering’s monopoly in the 
potassium chloride supplement market.4 
The court also emphasized the inherent 
exclusionary effect of Schering’s patent for 
K-Dur 20 and the legal presumption that 
the patent was valid. To that effect, the 
Court wrote: “By their nature, patents 
create an environment of exclusion, and 
consequently cripple competition.”5 Thus, 
the “proper analysis” for antitrust liability 
requires an examination of: (1) the scope 
of the exclusionary potential of the patent 
in question; (2) the extent to which the 
agreements exceed that scope; and (3) 
the resulting anticompetitive affects.6 
As to the ﬁrst two considerations, the 
court readily found that Schering’s 
agreements with Upsher and ESI were, 
in fact, less exclusionary than the K-Dur 
20 patent because they allowed entry of 
generic versions of the drug substantially 
before the patent’s expiration. 
With respect to the third consideration, 
the court found that any cognizable 
anticompetitive effects must be more 
than merely “hypothetical or presumed.” 
Any anticompetitive effects from 
Schering’s payments were ancillary to 
the parties’ goal of efﬁciently ending 
expensive and contentious litigation.7 
Finally, the court criticized the Commission 
for failing to account for the fact that 
“[r]everse payments are a natural by-
product of the Hatch-Waxman process” 
by which generic manufacturers are 
granted standing to mount prospective 
patent validity challenges, without 
incurring the cost of entry or risking 
enormous damages ﬂowing from possible 
infringement. The court also noted that 
prohibiting reverse payment settlements, 
3
4.    Schering-Plough v. Federal Trade Commission, No. 04-
10688, 2005 WL 528439 at 28 (11th Cir. Mar. 8, 2005).
5.    Id. at 19.
6.    The Eleventh Circuit ﬁrst articulated this standard in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm. 
Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003), a private lawsuit in which a generic drug manufacturer 
sought to strike down a settlement agreement between its rival and a pioneer drug maker.
7.    Schering-Plough, 2005 WL 528439 at 39.
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itself, could be anticompetitive. Such a 
prohibition would risk chilling generic 
manufacturers from challenging patents 
by limiting their settlement options should 
they be sued for patent infringement.
Conclusion
With the Eleventh Circuit rejecting its 
position on reverse payments, the FTC 
will now need to rethink its analysis. In 
the interim, carefully-tailored reverse 
payments may have found something of 
a safe harbor in the Eleventh Circuit, so 
long as: (1) the scope of the settlement 
agreement is properly tailored to be less 
exclusionary than the patent at issue; and 
(2) nothing suggests that the underlying 
patent litigation is not a bona ﬁde dispute.
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